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THE WAVERING, UNPREDICTABLE LINE
BETWEEN "SPEECH" AND CONDUCT: THE
FATE OF EXPRESSIVE CONDUCT AFTER
YOUNG v. NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT
AUTHORITY, 903 F.2d 146 (2d Cir. 1990)
The first amendment to the United States Constitution protects the
right to freedom of speech.' This fundamental right has been con-
strued to include much more than spoken and written words: it pro-
tects ideas,2 the solicitation of funds,3 and expressive conduct.4
1. The first amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. The first amendment protects the right to embrace and receive ideas. See, e.g.,
Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 866-69 (1982) (holding that school boards may
not remove books from school libraries simply because they dislike the ideas contained
in them); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-63 (1972) (the Constitution protects
the right to receive information and ideas, regardless of their value to society); Stanley
v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (same); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143
(1943) (the Constitution protects distribution of literature by Jehovah's Witnesses' irre-
spective of the ideas and views expressed therein).
3. See, e.g., Riley v. National Fed. of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781 (1988)
(holding that the first amendment protects the solicitation of charitable contributions by
an organization); Secretary of State v. J.H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947 (1984) (same);
Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env., 444 U.S. 620 (1980) (same); Vir-
ginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
761 (1976) (noting that oral solicitation requesting money is protected); Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976) (holding that political contributions are protected by the
first amendment).
4. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (extending first amendment
protection to an obscene sign on jacket in protest of the draft); Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (upholding the right to wear black
armbands to protest military action in Vietnam); Amalgamated Food Employees v. Lo-
gan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968) (holding that the first amendment protects
picketing); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 142 (1966) (noting that first amendment
rights are not limited to verbal expression); James v. Board of Educ. of Central Dist.
No. 1, 461 F.2d 566 (2d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042 (1972); West Virginia
State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632 (1943) (noting that a salute to the
American flag constitutes communicative conduct). See generally T. EMERSON, THE
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Protection of the latter has been grudgingly invoked and is afforded
less protection against governmental regulation.' It remains unclear
what type of conduct is sufficiently expressive to warrant first amend-
ment protection.6 In Young v. New York City Transit Authority,7 the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that begging and panhandling do
not constitute protected expressive conduct.' Consequently, the prohi-
bition of such conduct in the New York City subway system does not
violate the first amendment.9
In Young, the New York Transit Authority prohibited begging and
panhandling in the subway system.10 The Transit Authority later
amended the regulation to allow limited solicitation by charitable, reli-
gious or political organizations in the subway system." Homeless indi-
viduals, however, were still prohibited from soliciting contributions
SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 80 (1970) (the author suggests that to determine
whether an element is speech or conduct under the first amendment, consideration
should be given to the predominant element constituting the conduct).
5. Spoken and written words are given greater first amendment protection than
non-speech conduct. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (the Government
has greater freedom to restrict expressive conduct than the written and spoken word);
City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19 (1989) (same); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S.
367, 376-77 (1968) (same); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555 (1965) (conduct is not
afforded the same protection as pure speech).
Although first amendment rights may be preferred, their protection is not absolute.
See Brown v. Peyton, 437 F.2d 1228, 1231 (4th Cir. 1971) (noting that first amendment
rights are not unlimited and the state has the authority to impose reasonable restric-
tions); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 529-30 (1945) (the first amendment protects
labor relations discussions); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368-69 (1931) (the
state may punish freedom of speech abuse through the exercise of its police power).
6. The first amendment is applicable to the states through the fourteenth amend-
ment. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. 748, 748 n. 1 (1976) (same);
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 811 (1975) (same); Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S.
147, 160 (1939) (same).
7. 903 F.2d 146 (2d Cir. 1990). Petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court of the
United States is currently pending.
8. Id. at 154. See infra notes 10-16 and accompanying text for discussion of the
facts.
9. Young, 903 F.2d at 164. The court held that even if it assumed begging and
panhandling constituted expressive conduct, the New York City Transit Authority's
regulation was reasonable. Id. at 161.
10. Id. at 148; N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 21, § 1050.6(b) (1976).
11. Young, 903 F.2d at 149. This was added in a subsequent amendment to the
original regulation, as N.Y. COMIP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 21, § 1050.6(c) (1989). This
amendment provides that solicitation for charitable, religious or political causes is pro-
hibited on subway trains in areas not entirely open to the public, within a specified
distance from a token booth or entrance to an Authority office or tower. Id. The
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under the regulation. 2 The Transit Authority adopted the ban on so-
licitation as an attempt to alter the public's negative perception that the
subway system is dangerous and fraught with beggars.1
3
Plaintiffs filed suit challenging the Transit Authority's regulation
prohibiting begging and panhandling in the subway as an unconstitu-
tional violation of their first amendment rights. 14 The district court
held that begging constituted protected "speech" and permanently en-
joined the Transit Authority from enforcing the regulation.' The Sec-
ond Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and held that begging enjoys no
first amendment protection because such conduct bears no relationship
to any particularized message. 6
Transit Authority amended N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 21, § 1050.6(b) and (c).
The amended rule provides:
(b) No person, unless duly authorized by the Authority, shall engage in any com-
mercial activity upon any facility or conveyance. Commercial activities include (1)
the advertising, display, sale, lease, offer for sale or lease, or distribution of food,
goods, services or entertainment (including the free distribution of promotional
goods or materials), and (2) the solicitation of money or payment for food, goods,
services or entertainment. No person shall panhandle or beg upon any facility or
conveyance.
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGs. tit. 21, § 1050.6(b) (1989).
12. To better effectuate the longstanding ban on begging and panhandling in the
subway system, the Transit Authority commenced "Operation Enforcement" to in-
crease public awareness of prohibition. Young, 903 F.2d at 149.
13. The Transit Authority undertook a study on the perceived problems exper-
ienced by the approximately 3.5 million daily passengers who use the subway system.
Id. at 149. The study revealed that begging contributes to the public's perception that
the subway is "fraught with hazard and danger." Id. Moreover, the study found that
two-thirds of the subway riders have been coerced into giving beggars money. Id. Beg-
ging and panhandling in the subway system were distinguished from doing the same on
streets since the public is better able to avoid beggars on a street than in the constricted
passageways of the subway system. Id. at 150. See generally Gibbons, Begging: To
Give or Not to Give, TIME, Sept. 5, 1988, at 68 ("The sense of threat (of panhandling) is
strongest of all in the subway, the city's roaring underworld, where beggars play on the
tight, visceral fear of passengers riding the trains.").
14. 729 F. Supp. 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). The Legal Action Center for the Homeless
filed a class action suit on behalf of itself and two homeless men, William B. Young and
Joseph Walley, as representative plaintiffs for homeless and needy who earn their means
of support through begging and panhandling in the New York City subway system. Id.
at 345.
15. 729 F. Supp. at 359, 360. The district court concluded that the conduct of
begging included sufficient communicative aspects to merit first amendment protection.
Furthermore, the court stated there is no real distinction between solicitation of funds
by a charitable organization and an analogous request by an individual on his own
behalf. Id. at 352.
16. Young, 903 F.2d at 164. The court vacated the district court's permanent in-
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First amendment rights are fundamental and occupy a superior sta-
tus in our society.17 The first amendment protects both the freedom to
believe and the freedom to act."8 Although the freedom to believe is
absolute, the freedom to act is subject to regulation for the protection
of society.19 Any regulation of action must be reasonable20 and cannot
unduly infringe upon individual liberty.21 Absent a compelling govern-
mental interest, freedom of expression must predominate. 22 Unfortu-
nately, the Supreme Court has yet to articulate an explicit test for
determining when conduct becomes so intertwined with expression
that it is accorded the protected status of symbolic speech.23
One of the first cases to extend first amendment protection to expres-
sive conduct was Stromberg v. California.24 In Stromberg, a member
junction against the subway system. Id. The Young court was asked to decide the
constitutionality of the New York Penal Law under the due process clause of the New
York State Constitution. First, the court determined that the litigants had not estab-
lished an actual "case or controversy" required by article III of the United States Con-
stitution. Id. at 162. Next, the court assumed that even if a case or controversy had
been established, the court lacked pendent jurisdiction over the issue. Id. at 163.
17. But see Brown v. Peyton, 437 F.2d 1228, 1231 (4th Cir. 1971) (noting that first
amendment rights are not absolute; the state has authority to impose restrictions).
18. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940) (noting that the free-
dom of conscience beliefs are absolute); see also McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 626-27
(1978) (noting that the first amendment includes the freedom to vocalize and practice
beliefs).
19. See Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303-04; see also McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 626-27.
20. See Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 304 (striking down a regulation barring ministers
from candidacy for convention delegates because the first amendment protects the free-
dom of belief); see also McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 628 (same).
21. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 417 (1974) (Rehnquist & White, J.J., dis-
senting) (citing Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942)).
22. United Steelworkers v. Sadlowski, 457 U.S. 102 (1982).
23. Nimmer, The Meaning of Symbolic Speech Under the First Amendment, 21
UCLA L. REv. 29, 30 (1973).
24. 283 U.S. 359 (1931). Stromberg, perhaps the catalyst for the extension of first
amendment application to nonverbal conduct, was followed by other cases where ex-
pressive conduct was deemed protected. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community
School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (upholding the right to wear black armbands to pro-
test American involvement in the Vietnam War); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131,
141-42 (1966) (upholding the right to conduct a silent sit-in at a library because first and
fourteenth amendment freedom of speech rights "are not confined to verbal expres-
sion"); James v. Board of Educ. of Central Dist. No. 1, 461 F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1972)
(upholding the right to wear black armbands to protest American involvement in the
Vietnam War), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042 (1972) (same).
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of the Young Communist League2" was convicted under a California
statute that prohibited the display of the Communist flag in symbolic
opposition to the United States government.26 The United States
Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding that the first amend-
ment protected the display of the Communist flag, and stated that the
opportunity for free political expression is fundamental to our constitu-
tional system.27 Accordingly, the Court held that the statute was an
impermissible restraint on the exercise of free speech.28
In a decision seemingly contrary to Stromberg, the Supreme Court
developed a test to regulate nonspeech conduct in United States v.
O'Brien.29 In O'Brien, the defendant publicly burned his draft card to
protest the Vietnam War.3" The district court convicted O'Brien of
violating a federal statute which made the intentional destruction of a
draft card a criminal offense. 3 The First Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed the conviction, holding that O'Brien's act of burning the selec-
tive service card was protected "speech" under the first amendment.3 2
25. The Young Communist League is an international organization associated with
the Communist Party. Stromberg, 283 U.S. at 362.
26. Id. at 360. The relevant statute provided, in pertinent part:
Any person who displays a red flag, banner or badge or any flag, badge, banner, or
device of any color or form whatever in any public place or in any meeting place or
public assembly, or from or on any house, building or window as a sign, symbol or
emblem of opposition to organized government or as an invitation or stimulus to
anarchistic action or as an aid to propaganda that is of a seditious character is
guilty of a felony.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 403a (West 1919) (repealed 1933).
27. Stromberg, 238 U.S. at 369.
28. Id. at 368. In his dissent, Justice Butler emphasized that the question of
whether the display of the flag is protected by the first amendment was not before the
Court. Id. at 376.
29. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). The O'Brien Court distinguished Stromberg on the
grounds that the statute at issue there was directly aimed at the suppression of commu-
nication; therefore, it could not be upheld as a regulation of noncommunicative con-
duct. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 382. See supra note 26 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the statute in Stromberg.
30. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 369.
31. Id. at 369. The defendant burned his selective service certificate in violation of
§ 462(b) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1948 which makes it a
criminal offense for anyone to forge, alter, knowingly destroy or mutilate their selective
service certificate. Id. at 370. The district court noted that the Universal Military
Training and Service Act of 1948 did not violate the first amendment on its face. Id. at
370-71.
32. O'Brien v. United States, 376 F.2d 538, 541 (1st Cir. 1967). But cf. Smith v.
United States, 368 F.2d 529 (8th Cir. 1966) (upholding the Universal Military Training
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The Supreme Court reversed and upheld both the statute and the con-
viction.33 The Court rejected the notion that an unlimited array of
conduct constitutes protected "speech" whenever the person perform-
ing the conduct intends to convey an idea.34 Moreover, the Court held
that when "speech" and "non-speech" elements are incorporated into a
specific act, the government can impose reasonable restrictions on the
protected component if it can articulate a sufficient interest in regulat-
ing the "non-speech" component.3' Thus, the Court determined that
O'Brien's conduct in burning his draft card was not sufficiently expres-
sive to constitute "speech" within the meaning of the first
amendment.36
The Court explained the rationale for protecting expressive conduct
in Spence v. Washington.37 In an attempt to associate the American
flag with peace instead of war and violence, the defendant in Spence
temporarily affixed a peace symbol to a flag he owned and hung it from
his apartment window. 38 The defendant was convicted of violating a
and Service Act in the face of the same constitutional claims); United States v. Miller,
367 F.2d 72 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 911 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
33. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 386.
34. Id. at 376. See also Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (to determine
whether activity is protected by the first amendment, courts look at whether the con-
duct contains sufficient communicative elements).
35. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376. The Court held that the government regulation may
impose restrictions on expressive conduct if. (1) it is within the constitutional power of
the Government; (2) it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; (3)
the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and (4) the
incidental restriction on alleged first amendment freedoms is not greater than that nec-
essary to further the asserted governmental interest. Id. at 377. These four prongs are
referred to as the "O'Brien test."
In his concurring opinion, Justice Harlan made clear that O'Brien did not foreclose
first amendment claims when an expressive barrier prevents the "speaker" from com-
municating with a specific group of people he could not legally reach in another way.
Id. at 388-89 (Harlan, J., concurring). Harlan noted, however, that this was not a con-
cern in O'Brien because O'Brien had other means by which to communicate his
message. Id. at 389 (Harlan, J., concurring).
36. Id. at 376. The Court noted that even if such conduct constituted "speech"
within the meaning of the first amendment, the regulation on the protected expression
satisfied the four prongs of the O'Brien test. See supra note 35 and accompanying text
for discussion of the O'Brien test.
37. 418 U.S. 405 (1974). See . NOwAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 989 (3d ed. 1986) (noting a transition seems to have occurred from the
Court's distinction between speech and conduct in O'Brien to a balancing test of first
amendment interests against other governmental interests in Spence).
38. Spence, 418 U.S. at 405. Spence hung the altered flag to protest the invasion of
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state statute which forbade the display of the United States flag with an
attached symbol or figure.3 9 The Supreme Court reversed the convic-
tion because the defendant's activity was sufficiently communicative to
merit first amendment protection.' The Court examined Spence's ac-
tivity in conjunction with its context, and articulated a two-part test to
determine when conduct may be protected as "speech."4 First, the
actor must intend to convey a specific message; and second, the cir-
cumstances surrounding the activity must create a great likelihood that
those who view the conduct will be able to perceive its intended
message.42 Because Spence hung the altered flag to protest unpopular
military action in Vietnam, the Court concluded that his conduct con-
stituted a form of protected expression. 3
In 1980, the Supreme Court extended the freedom of expression to
charitable solicitations in Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better
Environment.' In Village of Schaumburg, the Court struck down an
ordinance which forbade charitable solicitations by organizations that
do not use at least seventy-five percent of their receipts for "charitable
purposes."4 5 Citizens for a Better Environment, a nonprofit organiza-
Cambodia and the killings at Kent State University--events which occurred a few days
prior to his arrest. Id.
39. Id. at 407. Spence was charged with violating the state's "improper use" stat-
ute. Id.
40. Id. The Court also took into consideration the fact that the flag was owned by
appellant, displayed on private property and the fact that Spence did not engage in
disorderly conduct. Id.
41. Id. at 409-10. The Court determined that because appellant altered the flag to
protest recent political events, his conduct was sufficiently expressive. Id. at 410.
42. Spence, 418 U.S. at 410, 411. See Nimmer, supra note 23, at 37 n.36 (explaining
that although an actor may intend his conduct to convey a message, the incidental non-
meaning effect should not divest the conduct of first amendment protection). But cf.
Note, Symbolic Conduct, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1091, 1117 n.35 (1968) (arguing that
there must be no intent other than communicative intent in order to receive first amend-
ment protection).
43. Spence, 418 U.S. at 410.
44. 444 U.S. 620, reh'g denied, 445 U.S. 972 (1980). For a discussion of charitable
solicitations, see Comment, Charitable Solicitation and the First Amendment: Village of
Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 21 URn. L. ANN. 273, 285 (1981)
(noting that the Supreme Court in Village of Schaumburg failed to clearly articulate the
requisite elements for the extension of first amendment protection to charitable
solicitations).
45. Village of Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 639. "Charitable purposes" did not include
solicitation expenses, salaries, overhead and other administrative expenses. Id. at 624.
The Village enacted the ordinance to prevent fraud. Id. at 636. The Court noted that
the substantial governmental interests in protecting the public from fraud, crime and
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tion supporting environmental programs, routinely canvassed door-to-
door to distribute literature, answer questions and solicit contribu-
tions.46 The organization's educational function was an important fac-
tor that led the Court to strike down the ordinance and hold that
solicitation and educative speech are inherently intertwined.47 Conse-
quently, charitable appeals for funds involve a variety of speech inter-
ests that invoke the first amendment's protection. 48
undue annoyance were only peripherally related to the constraint. Id. at 636. These
interests could be better served by means less intrusive than a direct ban on charitable
solicitation. Id. at 637.
Thus, the Court in Village of Schaumburg demonstrates that the burden of proof is
on the government to show that the regulation of charitable solicitation is necessary to
protect a compelling government interest. Id. at 636. But see, National Found. v. City
of Fort Worth, 415 F.2d 41, 46 (5th Cir. 1969) (placing the burden of proof on the
charitable organization to show that the ordinance is not necessary to protect a signifi-
cant governmental interest), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1040 (1970). See generally Com-
ment, supra note 44, at 284 (concluding that the Court's decision in Village of
Schaumburg is consistent with the Court's history of qualifying the power of govern-
ment to regulate free speech interests).
In post-Village of Schaumburg cases, the Supreme Court has consistently extended
first amendment protection of freedom of speech to the charitable solicitation of funds.
For example, in Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781 (1988),
the Court held that state regulation of charitable solicitation by professional fundraisers
violated the first amendment. Id. at 791. The Court declared, "It]he first amendment
mandates we presume that speakers, not the government, know best both what they
want to say and how to say it" and that the purpose of the first amendment is to deter
the government from assuming a "guardianship of the public mind." Id. The Court
feared that banning solicitation would thwart the flow of information peculiarly con-
nected with such solicitation and advocacy would cease. Id. at 796. See also Secretary
of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947 (1984) (striking down a state statute
limiting charities' expense payments to twenty-five percent of amount as an impermissi-
ble restraint on freedom of speech).
46. Village of Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 624, 626. See also Hynes v. Mayor of
Oradell, 425 U.S. 610 (1976) (to protect the public from crime and excessive hin-
drances, door-to-door solicitation is subject to reasonable restrictions).
47. Village of Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 632. But cf. Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S.
622 (upholding a criminal ordinance that prohibited door-to-door solicitation of maga-
zine subscriptions without a homeowner's request because the homeowner's privacy in-
terest outweighs the publisher's interest), reh'g denied, 342 U.S. 843 (1951).
48. Village of Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 632. These protected "speech interests" are
deemed to be the informative elements, the expression of ideas and viewpoints, and the
promotion of causes. Id. See also Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761 (1976) (declaring that speech is protected
"even though it may involve a solicitation to purchase or otherwise pay or contribute
money") (emphasis added). See generally Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304
(1940) (striking down a statute that outlawed the solicitation of money or objects of
value by any organization without prior approval declared invalid).
The Village of Schaumburg Court ascertained that it is clear that the Supreme
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In Clark v. Community for Creative Non- Violence,49 the Supreme
Court bypassed the issue of whether sleeping in tents constituted ex-
pressive conduct.5' In Clark, the Community for Creative Non-Vio-
lence sought to demonstrate the plight of the homeless in violation of a
National Park Service regulation that banned camping in national
parks outside of designated campgrounds. 5 The Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia held that prohibiting protesters from sleeping
in tents would significantly impinge upon their first amendment
rights.52 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that although sleep
may constitute expressive conduct,53 it may be subject to reasonable
regulation.54 Thus, even though symbolic expression is able to pass the
Court's history of cases protect speech utilized to solicit payments or contributions.
Village of Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 633. See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350,
379 (1977) (stating that attorney advertising is entitled to first amendment protection);
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265-66 (1964) (holding that expression
does not lose its constitutional protection simply because it is a paid advertisement).
In contrast, Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Village of Schaumburg supported the view
that a mere monetary request is not protected and that homeowners should be shielded
from such panhandlers. Village of Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 644 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
49. 468 U.S. 288 (1984).
50. Id. at 293.
51. Id. at 292. The group desired permission to sleep in Lafayette Park, located
across from the White House. Id. at 289. The National Park Service relied upon 36
C.F.R. §§ 50.19(e)(8) and 50.27(a) (1983) (statute regulating temporary structure use
and camping).
52. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Watt, 703 F.2d 586 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
The district court stated below that the Supreme Court has not sanctioned an "unwa-
vering first amendment line between speech and conduct." Id. at 592 n.13.
53. Clark, 468 U.S. at 293. The Clark Court stated, "We need not differ with the
view of the Court of Appeals that overnight sleeping in connection with the demonstra-
tion is expressive conduct protected to some extent by the first amendment. We assume,
for present purposes, but do not decide, that such is the case." Id. Cf. United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (holding that assuming arguendo that the alleged
communicative aspect is sufficient to be protected does not necessarily imply that the
act is protected).
54. Clark, 468 U.S. at 293. The regulation in Clark satisfied the four-part O'Brien
test. First, the regulation was justified without reference to the content of the regulated
speech. Second, the regulation was narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmen-
tal interest. Third, the restriction was reasonable. Finally, the regulation left open al-
ternative means of communication. Id.
The Clark Court reasoned that any expression may be restricted by reasonable time,
place, and manner restrictions. Id. at 293. See also Comment, National Park Service
Regulations Prohibiting "Camping" as Applied to Demonstrators Who Wish to Sleep in
Public Parks Does Not Violate First Amendment Rights: Clark v. Community for Crea-
tive Non-Violence, 10 T. MARSHALL L.J. 667 (1984).
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Spence test,55 it may be forbidden or limited if the conduct itself may
be constitutionally regulated.56
Recently, however, the Supreme Court extended the first amend-
ment's protection to purely symbolic conduct in Texas v. Johnson ." In
Johnson, a protester was convicted of burning an American flag in vio-
lation of a Texas statute that prohibited the intentional desecration of
the flag.58 Johnson burned the flag during the Republican National
Convention in protest to the policies of the Reagan administration.5 9
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reversed Johnson's conviction,
recognizing that Johnson's conduct constituted protected symbolic
speechA0 The United States Supreme Court affirmed, holding that
Johnson's burning of the flag constituted expressive conduct. 6, The
Johnson Court deemed the flag to be "[p]regnant with expressive con-
55. For a discussion of the Spence test, see supra note 42 and accompanying text.
56. Clark, 468 U.S. at 293. Conduct can be regulated if the regulation is narrowly
drawn to further a substantial governmental interest, and if the interest is unrelated to
the suppression of free speech. Id. (citing O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 367).
57. 491 U.S. 397 (1989). But see County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573
(1989) (a divided Court decided that the display of a creche violated the first amend-
ment's establishment clause).
58. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 398. Johnson was convicted of violating the Texas Penal
Code which defines desecration as physical mistreatment which the actor knows will
seriously offend any persons likely to observe or discover the action. TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. § 42.09 (b) (Vernon 1989).
59. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 398.
60. Johnson v. State, 755 S.W.2d 92 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
61. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 397. The Court applied the Spence test. See supra notes
41-42 and accompanying text for a discussion of Spence. The Court compared John-
son's actions to a number of different actions deemed expressive by the Court in the
past. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404. See United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 176 (1983)
(extending first amendment protection to picketing for cause); Schacht v. United States,
398 U.S. 58 (1970) (extending first amendment protection to individuals wearing Amer-
ican military uniforms in protest of Vietnam War); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Com-
munity School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505 (1969) (students wearing black armbands to
protest American involvement in Vietnam constituted expressive conduct); Amalga-
mated Food Employees v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 313-14 (1968) (ex-
tending first amendment protection to picketing for cause); Brown v. Louisiana, 383
U.S. 131, 141-42 (1966) (blacks conducting a sit-in in a "whites only" area to protest
school segregation deemed expressive).
The Johnson Court also noted the particular communicative nature of the flag. John-
son, 491 U.S. at 404. See, e.g., Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. at 409-10 (1974) (at-
taching a peace sign to the flag constitutes expressive conduct); West Virginia State Bd.
of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632 (1943) (saluting the flag is protected conduct);
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368-69 (1931) (display of the Communist flag is
protected conduct).
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tent." '62 Refusing to conclude that every action taken with respect to
the flag is expressive, the Court took into account the context63 in
which the flag burning occurred." Because Johnson acted to protest
the policies of the Reagan administration, the Court viewed the flag
burning as being sufficiently imbued with the elements of communica-
tion to warrant first amendment protection.6 5
The Johnson decision reconfirms the need to scrutinize the govern-
mental interest underlying a restriction of expressive conduct. 66 The
fundamental principle underlying the first amendment is that the gov-
ernment may not prohibit the expression of an idea merely because
society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.67 Furthermore,
the Johnson Court emphasized that an important rationale behind the
62. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 405. The Court stated that the flag symbolizes the United
States like the letters found in the word "America." Id.
63. The Court's approach mirrored the analytic framework laid out in Spence, 418
U.S. at 409 (relying on the context in which the conduct occurs to determine whether
first amendment protection will be afforded). See supra notes 37-43 and accompanying
text.
64. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 405.
65. Id. (citing Spence, 418 U.S. at 409).
66. Id. at 407. The Government's asserted interests included: (1) preventing
breaches of the peace; and, (2) preserving the flag as a symbol of national unity. Id. As
for the State's first concern, the Court held that the offensive nature of a certain expres-
sive conduct does not necessarily imply that observers will be provoked to disturb the
peace. Id. at 409. The Court next held the State's second interest invalid because it
related to the "suppression of free expression." Id. at 410. Thus, the State's interest in
preserving the flag as a symbol of national unity did not justify a criminal statute
prohibiting political expression. Id. at 420.
The Court concluded that Johnson was convicted for his objection to the policies of
this country--expression fundamental to our first amendment values. Id. at 411. See,
e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988) (the first amendment reflects a profound na-
tional commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited
and wide open).
67. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 414. The courts have not yet recognized an exception to
this principal. Id. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Fawell, 485 U.S. 46, 55-56
(1988) (holding that the state's interest in protecting public figures from emotional dis-
tress is not sufficient to deny first amendment protection to speech that is patently offen-
sive); City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 (1984) (noting that the
government may not regulate speech in order to favor certain ideas at the expense of
others); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 462-63 (1980) (state statute favoring one view-
point over another impermissible); Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972) (not-
ing that the government cannot restrict activity merely because of its message); Brown
v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 142-43 (1966) (participation of blacks in a sit-in at a public
library constitutionally protected); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368-69 (1931)
(display of Communist flag protected).
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constitutional freedom of speech guarantee is the desire to incite con-
troversy.68 The Court noted that the purpose of the first amendment
may be best served when it creates dissatisfaction with the status quo
and incites citizens to action.69
Cognizant of the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Johnson, the
court in Young v. New York City Transit Authority7 ° confronted a
claim that panhandling in the subway constituted expressive conduct.
In Young, the court concluded that begging is not protected expressive
conduct,71 rejecting the district court's position that a needy person
68. The Johnson Court also noted that the "emotive impact of speech on its audi-
ence is not a 'secondary effect' " unrelated to the content of the expression itself. John-
son, 491 U.S. at 412 (citing Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988)).
69. 491 U.S. at 408-09. Precedents recognize that a principle function of free speech
under our system of government is to invite dispute. It may best serve its purpose when
it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or
even stirs people to anger. Id. at 409 (citing Terminello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4
(1949)). See also Falwell, 485 U.S. at 55-56 (first amendment protects ad parody carica-
ture); Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 615 (1971) (striking down statute that prohib-
ited "annoying" conduct); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508-
09 (1969) (schoolchildren's wearing of black armbands to protest the government's pol-
icy is protected); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 551 (1965) (civil rights demonstration
near courthouse is protected conduct).
70. 903 F.2d 146 (2d Cir. 1990). See supra notes 10-17 and accompanying text for a
detailed outline of the facts. Two lower court decisions not taken into account by the
Young court but related to the constitutionality of begging regulations are Ulmer v.
Municipal Court, 55 Cal. App. 3d 263, 127 Cal. Rptr. 445 (1976) and C.C.B. v. State,
458 So. 2d 47 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984). In Ulmer, the defendant was charged with
"accosting another in a public place for the purpose of begging or soliciting for alms."
Ulmer, 55 Cal. App. 3d at 265, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 446. The court held that because
conveying information or ideas is not integral to the conduct of begging, first amend-
ment protection will not be extended to protect such conduct. Id. at 266, 127 Cal Rptr.
at 447. The CC.B. court distinguished the statute at issue in Ulmer from a total prohi-
bition on beggers. Id. at 49-50. In making its determination, the C. CB. court noted the
statute in Ulmer only applies to those individuals who actually "accost" others and does
not apply to those who merely sit around and do not approach the public for money.
Id. at 49 (citing Ulmer, 55 Cal. App. 3d at 266, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 445). The C.C.B.
court declared that "a total prohibition of begging or soliciting alms for oneself is an
unconstitutional abridgement of the right to free speech" and that "protecting citizens
from mere undue annoyance is not a sufficient compelling reason to absolutely deprive
one of a first amendment right." Id. at 49 (citing Coates, 402 U.S. 611 (1971)).
71. Young, 903 F.2d at 153. The court concluded that speech is not inherent in the
act of begging, nor is it a necessary part of the conduct. Id. at 154. Although the scope
of this case comment is limited to the question of whether the activities of begging and
panhandling constitute expressive conduct, the holding in Young does not ultimately
rest on the distinction between speech and conduct, but on the satisfaction of the four
elements of the O'Brien test. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of the O'Brien test; see also infra note 86 for a discussion of the different levels of
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communicates when he extends his hand.7 2 The Second Circuit upheld
the panhandling regulation on three separate grounds. The court first
concluded that panhandlers do not have the intent to convey an idea,
and even if they did, it is unlikely that the public would be able to
ascertain the message.7 3 Next, the court declared that not all conduct
is speech.74 Finally, the court concluded that begging and panhandling
are not sufficiently similar to charitable solicitation so as to warrant
first amendment protection.75
The court first applied the Spence test76 and determined that the ele-
ment of intent was not satisfied by the conduct of begging and panhan-
dling in the subway system.77 In reaching its conclusion, the court
stated that most individuals do not beg in order to communicate a spe-
cific message, but merely do so to collect money.7 8 The court further
determined that even if the beggar had the requisite intent to convey a
specific message, it is unlikely that subway passengers would be able to
discern the precise message.7 9
judicial scrutiny the courts apply in determining the validity of governmental regula-
tions which have an impact on the exercise of free speech.
72. Young, 903 F.2d at 150. Appellees accepted that the restrictions in the
amended regulation were constitutionally valid. Id.
73. See infra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
74. See infra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
75. See infra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
76. See supra note 42 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Spence test.
77. Young, 903 F.2d at 153. The Spence test was then applied with the conclusion
that begging is not inherently intertwined with a "particularized message" and, the like-
lihood was not great that the message would be understood by those who viewed it. Id.
at 153-54. The court expressed doubt as to whether begging and panhandling in sub-
ways have a sufficiently communicative character to justify constitutional protection.
Id. at 153. See Spence, 418 U.S. at 410-12 (altered flag hung in protest to political event
constituted protected expression); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 405 (1989) (flag
deemed to be "[p]regnant with expressive content.").
78. Young, 903 F.2d at 153.
79. Id. at 153-54. The court determined that even when an individual intends to
communicate a particularized message through the act of begging, the context of the
situation may deprive the conduct of any expressive element deserving of first amend-
ment protection. Id. at 154.
The Young court acknowledged that although subway passengers generally under-
stand the "generic message" expressed by begging, it falls far outside the scope of pro-
tected speech under the first amendment. Id. The Supreme Court declared in City of
Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989), "[i]t is possible to find some kernel of expres-
sion in almost every activity a person undertakes... but such a kernel is not sufficient
to bring the activity within the protection of the first amendment." Id.
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Second, the court applied the O'Brien test,8" and rejected the posi-
tion that all conduct can be labeled "speech" whenever the person in-
tends to express an idea.8" The court reasoned that unlike inherently
expressive conduct such as flag burning, begging in the subway is
viewed as deviant behavior irrespective of an intent to convey a specific
message. 82
Finally, the court reasoned that begging is not sufficiently analogous
to the charitable solicitation deemed protected in Village of Schaum-
burg.8" The court distinguished charitable solicitation from begging
because charitable solicitation has a "sufficient nexus" with a variety of
first amendment interests.84 According to the court, organized chari-
ties serve the public good by enhancing communication and dissemi-
nating ideas, while panhandling in the subway is merely a "menace to
the common good."85 Therefore, the Young court held that begging
and panhandling are not sufficiently expressive to merit first amend-
ment protection.86
80. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
81. Young, 903 F.2d at 152-53. In addition, appellants challenged the constitution-
ality of the distinction between solicitation for charitable religious or political causes
and solicitation of alms by private individuals. Id. at 150. Consequently, appellants
asserted that the total ban on begging and panhandling in the subway system is consti-
tutionally impermissible. Id.
82. -Id. at 154. ("The case at bar is therefore unlike one where ... the communica-
tion allegedly integral to the conduct is itself thought to be harmful" (quoting O'Brien
v. United States, 391 U.S. 367, 382 (1968))).
83. Id. at 156. The court rejected the district court's finding that there is no mean-
ingful distinction between charitable solicitations and begging. Id. at 155. The district
court relied on Riley v. National Fed. of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781 (1988)
("our prior cases teach that the solicitation of charitable contributions is free speech
.. "); Secretary of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947 (1984) (percentage
restriction on charitable solicitation is unconstitutional); Village of Schaumburg v. Citi-
zens for a Better Env., 444 U.S. 620 (1980) (dissemination of information in charitable
solicitation considered an important factor). Young, 903 F.2d at 152. The Second Cir-
cuit referred to these cases as the "Schaumburg trilogy." Id. at 154. The dissent in
Young did not see a distinction between charitable solicitation and begging. Id. at 164
(Meskill, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 155. The Transit Authority amended the regulation to allow solicitation
by organized charities in certain areas of the subway. Id. This is consistent with the
Village of Schaumburg reasoning.
85. Id. at 156. The government may shield citizens from exposure to various forms
of expression which may decrease aesthetic values or be deemed to be a public nuisance.
City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 805 (1984). Although the public
perceives that beggars and panhandlers pervade the system, there is no evidence that
passengers feel similarly coerced by charitable organizations. Young, 903 F.2d at 156.
86. The Young court concluded that even if begging is communicative in nature, the
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In dissent, Judge Meskill argued that the first amendment recognizes
no distinction between charitable solicitation by organized charities
and solicitation by beggars.87 The dissent interpreted the Village of
Schaumburg Court's analysis to confer first amendment protection
upon all charitable solicitations, whether it be by an organized charity
or by a homeless individual. 8 The dissent further argued that beggars
and panhandlers engage in protected conduct because they often orally
communicate with potential donors about the problems of the home-
less, the inadequacies of public shelters, and the inefficiencies of New
York City's social service system. 9 Because the first amendment
would protect a beggar who holds a sign declaring, "I am homeless" or
"I am hungry," it is unrealistic to distinguish between beggars who
hold signs communicating a written message, and those who express
their message orally.9° To hold that a beggar's individual plight is less
worthy of protection than the same interest asserted by an organized
charity clearly offends the spirit of the Supreme Courts' prior
holdings.9 1
governmental interest was sufficient to withstand the appropriate level of judicial scru-
tiny. Id. at 157. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 12-2
(2d ed. 1988). Tribe suggests that there are two levels or "tracks" of judicial scrutiny:
(1) government restriction of ideas or information aimed at communicative impact will
be unconstitutional unless the message poses a clear and present danger; and (2) govern-
ment can impose regulations aimed at the noncommunicative impact while asserting
other interests. The latter governmental interest must only meet the test of not unduly
restricting the flow of information and ideas. Id. § 12-2 at 789-92.
The Young court determined that the latter, or second "track", is the appropriate
test. Young, 903 F.2d at 157. Consequently, the court applied the lower level of scru-
tiny in determining that the restriction on begging and panhandling in the subway sys-
tem did not unduly restrict the free flow of ideas. See generally L. TRIBE, supra, at
§ 12-2.
87. Young, 903 F.2d at 164 (Meskill, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 165. In the dissent's view, begging constitutes speech protected by the
first amendment. Id. at 168. Although the dissent concedes that this "speech" may be
regulated to achieve the asserted governmental interests, it may not be entirely banned.
Id.
89. Id. at 165.
90. Id. In his dissent, Judge Meskill argues that because first amendment protec-
tion extends to charitable solicitation unaccompanied by speech, it must also extend to
begging and panhandling. Id. See Riley v. National Fed. of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487
U.S. 781, 789 (1988) (citing the Village of Schaumburg Court's refusal "to separate the
component parts of charitable solicitations from the fully protected whole"); see also
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 764 (1976) (holding commercial speech to be protected although "not all commer-
cial messages contain the same or even a very great public interest element").
91. Young, 903 F.2d at 167 (Meskill, J., dissenting). The dissent found it difficult to
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The Young court's reluctance to equate the conduct of begging and
panhandling with speech reflects a common fear: courts are afraid that
if they are too lenient with the first amendment standards for expres-
sive conduct, all conduct will be characterized as "speech". 92 In re-
sponse to that fear, the Young court failed to make a logical extension
of clearly defined first amendment doctrine.
Access to unrestrained political discussion is a fundamental principle
of our constitutional system.93 The Court consistently adopts the prin-
ciple that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea
merely because it offends society.94 The Young decision, however, at-
tempts to restrict the presence and conduct of beggars simply because
society finds them offensive. Admittedly, not all conduct deserves first
amendment protection." The Supreme Court, in O'Brien, certainly
did not intend to give the courts and the government a lethal weapon
to eliminate the protection of expressive conduct under the guise of
pretextual governmental interests.96
Moreover, the Supreme Court has unequivocally declared that the
solicitation of money is entitled to first amendment protection.97 The
reconcile how the Transit Authority could allow an organized charity to collect money
to help the plight of the homeless, yet refuse to allow the assertion of the same interest
exerted by the beggars. Id.
Furthermore, the dissent expressed concern that there is no evidence of the extent, if
any, of the harassment felt by passengers when approached by organized charities in the
pursuit of their solicitation of money. Id. at 168.
92. Note, supra note 42, at 1113 & n. 125 (courts often assume that the conduct at
bar is speech; however, in practice, the Court is fearful that all conduct might be
deemed speech). See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (court willing
to assume that destroying a draft card is speech); United States v. Miller, 367 F.2d 72,
79 (1966) (same).
93. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931).
94. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 408 (1989). See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312
(1988) (plurality opinion). The Supreme Court reasoned that the impact of speech on
others is related to the content of the expression itself and therefore should not under-
mine first amendment concerns. Id. at 321. See also supra notes 67-69 and accompany-
ing text.
95. "We cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can
be labeled 'speech' whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends to express an
idea." O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 371. See also Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409
(1974) (same).
96. See supra notes 29-36 and accompanying text for discussion of the O'Brien
decision.
97. See, eg., Riley v. National Fed. of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781 (1988)
(solicitation of charitable contributions by an organization is protected under the first
amendment); Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 633
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Young court, however, characterized the Village of Schaumburg analy-
sis to include a test requiring a "sufficient nexus" between solicitation
by organized charities and a variety of speech interests requiring the
dissemination of information, messages, and ideas.98 Although the
public may not be educationally enhanced through its interaction with
beggars, these individuals have the potential to convey messages sim-
lar to those of an organized charity. In reality, the public's interaction
with beggars does reveal an important social and political message: it
makes the public aware of the plight of the homeless.99 Frequently,
begging is the only way that homeless individuals are able to express
themselves because beggars are often uneducated and penniless,1oo
lacking the necessary means to express their message.' 1 Perhaps the
resulting increased social awareness will form the impetus for future
action. One thing is for certain: suppression of this vital form of ex-
pression will only result in public ignorance and governmental
inaction.10 2
As a matter of policy, if the constitutional guarantee of freedom of
speech is not to be trivialized, the government cannot suppress expres-
(1980) (speech is protected even though it may involve a solicitation to purchase or
otherwise pay or contribute money); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761 (1976) (same); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
25 (1976) (the right to make a political contribution is protected under the first amend-
ment). See also supra note 3 and accompanying text.
98. Young, 903 F.2d at 155.
99. Id. at 165 (Meskill, J., dissenting).
100. Many of the beggars are also homeless. Cockburn, Begging for Mercy, NEW
STATESMAN & SOC'Y, Sept. 23, 1988, at 14. Studies have shown that in New York City,
only 45% of the male and 54% of the female homeless individuals had completed high
school. R. ROPERS, THE INVISIBLE HOMELESS: A NEW URBAN ECOLOGY 36 (1988).
Cf. F. REDBURN AND T. Buss, RESPONDING TO AMERIcA's HOMELESS 31 (1986)
(only 30.8% of the Ohio homeless sample had completed high school, while 17.3% had
completed only one to eight years of school). See generally Note, The Beggar's Free
Speech Claim, 65 IND L.J. 191, 210 (1989) (arguing that because homeless beggars are
not included in the political process and are unable to vote because they do not have a
mailing address, the court should impose heightened judicial scrutiny to regulations
impinging on their first amendment rights).
101. "Symbolic conduct has been called 'the poor man's printing press' without the
power, prestige, and financial resources to publicize their written or verbal message,
action is the only way for many people to effectively convey their views to a wide group
of people." Note, First Amendment Protection of Ambiguous Conduct, 84 COLUM. L.
REV. 467, 471 (1984).
102. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Coun-
cil, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (condemning the state's attempt to achieve its goal by
keeping people in ignorance).
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sive conduct merely to avoid a minor public inconvenience. The Sec-
ond Circuit's decision in Young v. New York City Transit Authority 10 3
that begging and panhandling do not constitute protected first amend-
ment expression has the potential to create a wavering, unpredictable
line between protected solicitation of funds by an organization and the
charitable solicitation of funds by an individual. The Young decision
has the potential to thwart the free expression of many individuals oc-
cupying a similar position in society who are attempting to advance
their interests in the best way they are capable-through symbolic
conduct.
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